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Abstract
This article sets out three ambitions: First, it argues in favor of adopting “turbulence” as a con-
ceptual device for understanding governance in times of dynamic interactive change. Second, the 
article distinguishes three types of turbulence: turbulent environments, turbulent organizations 
and turbulence of scale. These three types highlight different sources and dynamics of turbulence. 
Third, the article outlines an organizational-institutional approach to the governance of turbulence 
highlighting four key dilemmas public organizations must confront in stabilizing and adapting to 
turbulence: stability versus adaptation; anticipation versus resilience; tight(er) coupling versus 
decoupling; and integration versus differentiation. The article then synthesizes findings and argu-
ments about how public organizations can manage these dilemmas.
Introduction
The decision of UK citizens to “Brexit” in 2016 illus-
trates that Europe is in a stage of accelerating turbu-
lence in search of political order (Olsen 2007). The 
unruly politics leading to the British referendum are 
now being followed by the chaotic politics of extri-
cating UK political institutions and markets from the 
European Union (EU). More far-reaching still, Brexit 
threatens serious cascading effects, such as intensified 
Scottish demands for independence from the United 
Kingdom. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, the 2016 
US Presidential campaign revealed an analogous kind 
of turbulence (Kristof 2016). The surprising nomina-
tion of Donald Trump as presidential candidate and 
his subsequent electoral victory has thrown American 
politics into turmoil, portending cascading political 
dynamics that will play out in unknown ways over the 
next decade. Both incidents illustrate competing and 
shifting ideas about the “forms of political associa-
tion” and highlight the turbulent character of govern-
ance (Bulmer and Joseph 2016). Yet this article argues 
that turbulence is hardly limited to such earth-shaking 
events. Turbulence might be a normal and enduring, 
yet unrecognized, feature of contemporary public gov-
ernance, not merely a transitional anomaly.
Turbulent governance, we argue, requires public 
organizations to face governance challenges of certain 
kinds—situations where events, demands, and support 
interact and change in highly variable, inconsistent, 
unexpected or unpredictable ways (Ansell et al. 2017; 
Easton 1965; Gunnell 2011; Miller 1971). The article 
has three ambitions: First, it suggests “turbulence” as 
a conceptual device for understanding governance in 
times of dynamic interactive change. Second, the arti-
cle identifies three types of turbulence: turbulent envi-
ronments, turbulent organizations and turbulence of 
scale. These distinctions suggest different sources and 
dynamics of turbulence and bound the topic in order 
to facilitate subsequent investigation. Third, the article 
outlines an organizational-institutional approach that 
highlights the role of organizations and institutions 
in the governance of turbulence. The ambition of the 
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article is synthetic: to draw together ideas from institu-
tional theory, organization theory, public administra-
tion, governance theory, and political science to set out 
expectations about how public organizations are likely 
to respond to and manage precipitous, conflicting, and 
novel—in short, turbulent—governance challenges.
The concept of turbulence originally developed 
in physics to describe chaotic fluid dynamics—such 
as stormy weather or complex river currents. In his 
attempts to conceptualize the dynamic complexity of 
international politics, Rosenau (1990, 1997) was per-
haps the first to draw an analogy between these fluid 
dynamics and the turbulence of contemporary gov-
ernance. Following Rosenau, this article argues that 
the concept of turbulence directs analytical attention 
towards how governing organizations handle unsta-
ble, unsettled and fluid public domains (Olsen 2017; 
Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrahi 2014). Yet, how challeng-
ing is turbulence to public governance? The answer 
depends on whether we look at turbulence as a con-
dition or a dysfunction. If an intensification of speed, 
complexity and conflict is understood to be a condition 
of contemporary governance—as argued by Rosenau 
(1990) and earlier by David Easton (1965)—then the 
implication is that efficient and effective governing 
institutions must manage turbulence as a critical con-
dition of the governing process. Government agencies 
that do not function well in turbulent conditions, for 
example, are likely to perform poorly, make mistakes 
and face criticism. Treating turbulence as a condition 
leads to an investigation of how well the strategy and 
structure of governing institutions are adapted to tur-
bulent conditions. However, there is also another way 
of looking at turbulence. Rather than being understood 
as a basic condition of governing, turbulence is often 
commonly understood to be dysfunctional—that is, as 
exceptional, dangerous, or contradictory. Seen in this 
light, turbulence may push organizations and institu-
tions to their limits and threaten surprising cascading 
dynamics that test the sustainability of existing govern-
ance arrangements. Or it might produce maladaptive 
behaviors that trap governance into suboptimal out-
comes. From this perspective, the emphasis shifts from 
how governing institutions manage turbulence to how 
they withstand it.
Whether as a condition or as a dysfunction, tur-
bulence increasingly appears to have become a “new 
normal” in public governance. Why is this the case? 
There are a number of ways to address this question. 
One type of account references real-world events 
like globalization, disruptive technological changes, 
the end of the cold war, tensions around European 
integration, or the rise of terrorism (Drucker 1993; 
Giddens 2013; Greenspan 2008; Papastergiadis 2013; 
Rosenau 1990, 1997, 2005). Another kind of account 
focuses on the changing character of politics, which 
has become more pluricentric, fiscally volatile and 
polarized, with new forms of social media and a 24-h 
information cycle that erode trust and speed politi-
cal fallout (Ashworth and Heyndels 2002; Margetts 
et  al. 2015; Rosenau 1990; Sørensen and Torfing 
2007; Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrahi 2014). A  third 
type of account focuses on the nature of public prob-
lems, many of which are now deemed “wicked” or 
even “superwicked.” These problems are complex, 
multi-dimensional, and rife with value conflict (Head 
and Alford 2015; Levin et  al. 2012). A  fourth type 
of account refer to organizational and institutional 
complexity, noting that supply chains are longer, 
policy books thicker, and public agencies must deal 
with a dizzying array of stakeholder concerns (Orren 
and Skowronek 1996; Room 2011; Rosenau 1990). 
Meanwile, institutional environments have become 
more pluralistic (Kraatz and Block 2008) and organi-
zation and policy reform have become nearly routine 
processes (Beabout 2012; Hahm et al. 2013; Wynen 
et al. 2017). Looking across these accounts, the inten-
sification of speed, complexity and conflict appear to 
be the common factors that that produce turbulent 
public governance.
Whatever the precise source or cause, our goal is 
to set out a broad framework in which to examine 
how governing organizations and institutions interact 
with and adapt to this turbulence. Our intention is to 
frame the issue of turbulence theoretically and ori-
ent researchers toward concrete empirical questions. 
To do this, we outline an organizational-institutional 
approach that emphasizes that organizations and insti-
tutions are critical structures and agents that directly 
influence the production, management, and adapta-
tion to turbulence. They affect the basic factors that 
contribute to turbulence and their patterns of interac-
tion; they also shape how different levels of turbulence 
interact and, via their strategies and resilience, affect 
the nature of institutional change. Exploring how 
organizations and institutions confront turbulence 
offers opportunities for scholarly reflection, suggesting 
new ways forward in the study of the organizational 
basis of public governance (Egeberg et al. 2016; Olsen 
2010). We begin this task by defining the basic concept 
of turbulence and discussing why it is a useful analyti-
cal construct.
Conceptualizing Turbulence
Whereas some authors use the term turbulence merely 
as a catch phrase (e.g., Waldo 1971), this article builds 
on work that treats turbulence as an analytical concept 
(Emery and Trist 1965). We define turbulence as “a 
situation where events, demands and support interact 
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and change in highly variable, inconsistent, unexpected 
or unpredictable ways.”1 As a generic analytical con-
cept, turbulence has both strengths and weaknesses. 
On the one hand, the factors that produce turbulence 
are typically situationally and conjuncturally specific 
and often quite unique. One manager’s turbulence 
will not be another’s. Therefore, the idea that we can 
construct a general body of knowledge about such 
context-bound phenomena is without a doubt chal-
lenging. On the other hand, the powerful value of such 
a generic analytic construct is precisely that it calls 
attention to common challenges public organizations 
and institutions encounter across very different kinds 
of circumstances. These common challenges are related 
to three dimensions of turbulence that are only weakly 
captured by other concepts in public administration 
and governance:
Shifting Parameters: One of the striking phrases 
Emery and Trist (1965, 26)  used to describe 
turbulence was the “ground is in motion.” This 
phrase suggests that the stable parameters organ-
izations and institutions depend upon—such as 
budgets, political support, or technology—are 
changing while at the same time making new 
moorings for planning and operations difficult to 
establish. Similarly, Rosenau (1990, 10) depicted 
turbulence in world affairs as centered on par-
ametric change along three dimensions. First, 
transformation of the overall structure of global 
politics (becoming multi-centric), changes in 
authority structures (a fundamental relocation of 
political authority), and revolution in the skills of 
citizens (becoming increasingly competent in pol-
itics). The ensuing consequence was uncertainty 
(Rosenau 1990, 8).2 A  common dilemma when 
the “ground is in motion” is that by the time you 
have developed actionable knowledge, the world 
may have moved on (March 1991; Posen and 
Levinthal 2012).
Intercurrence: The concept of turbulence in fluid 
dynamics depicts a transition from smooth and 
well-ordered “laminar” flows giving way to 
complex, non-linear “eddies.” The analogy in 
the world of institutions, organizations and gov-
ernance is where unexpected interactions occur 
between otherwise independent or compartmen-
talized subsystems, institutional logics or govern-
ing norms or across jurisdictional boundaries. 
In institutional theory, Orren and Skowronek 
(1996) used the term “intercurrence” to capture 
these unexpected institutional entanglements. 
These entanglements are often experienced by 
managers as a sudden recognition of unexpected 
interdependence that produces “rogue” outcomes 
(Schulman and Roe 2016).
Temporal Complexity: While public administra-
tion often conceptualizes organizational struc-
tures and environments as complex, our field has 
rarely grappled theoretically with the temporal 
complexity that organizations must deal with. 
This temporal complexity often arises from mul-
tiple or shifting tempos, such as when organiza-
tions must shift from routine program action 
to rapid response (Bigley and Roberts 2001; 
Laporte and Consolini 1991), when different 
time horizons clash (Snook 2002), or when com-
peting schedules and time frames must be aligned 
(Granqvist and Gustafsson 2016; Reinecke and 
Ansari 2015).
In each of these cases, turbulence is closely associated 
with interdependence, a widely used concept in pub-
lic administration and governance. What is distinctive 
about turbulence is that it stresses the dynamic element 
of interdependence and emphasizes the importance of 
time, timing, and change: parameters change, unex-
pected interactions occur, and different temporalities 
must be aligned.3 By conceptualizing this dynamic 
interdependence from the perspective of those who 
experience it, the concept of turbulence provides a van-
tage point from which to examine how public organi-
zations react, manage and adapt to it.
Turbulence is also closely related to the concept of 
uncertainty and the two concepts are sometimes used 
interchangeably. Used precisely, however, they call 
attention to different dimensions of experience. The 
primary sense of turbulence is a condition of dynamic 
interactive change that is difficult to respond to 
because it is highly variable, inconsistent, unexpected 
or unpredictable. Very often such conditions produce 
uncertainty. As Cameron et al. (1987, 225) observe:
“…writers have frequently used turbulence and 
uncertainty synonymously. But…[t]urbulence 
usually creates uncertainty, so that uncertainty 
is best thought of as an outcome of turbulence 
1 For ideas about how to operationalize environmental turbulence, see 
Volberda and van Bruggen (1997). Although there is an extensive body 
of literature operationalizing turbulence for private organizations, there 
are only a few examples for public sector organizations (see Boyne and 
Meier (2009) and Nohrstedt and Bodin (2014)).
2 Cameron et al. observe that “…writers have frequently used turbulence 
and uncertainty synonymously. But…[t]urbulence usually creates 
uncertainty, so that uncertainty is best thought of as an outcome of 
turbulence rather than a synonym…[S]tudies have consistently shown 
that turbulence is the best predictor of perceived environmental 
uncertainty...” (Cameron et al. 1987, 225).
3 For a wider discussion of the importance of being more attentive to 
temporality in public administration, see Howlett and Goetz (2014).
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rather than a synonym…[S]tudies have consist-
ently shown that turbulence is the best predictor 
of perceived environmental uncertainty....
Most importantly, turbulence is a description of a cer-
tain pattern of change, whereas uncertainty is a descrip-
tion about a state of information and knowledge.
The widely-used concept of crisis does do some of 
the same analytical work that we envision for the con-
cept of turbulence and the two concepts clearly over-
lap to some extent. However, we would argue that 
they have a different scope and purpose. Consider the 
following commonly cited definition of a crisis from 
the crisis management literature: a crisis represents “a 
serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamen-
tal values and norms of a system, which under time 
pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessi-
tates making vital decisions” (Rosenthal et al. 1989, 
10). According to Boin et al. (2005, 3–4), key prop-
erties of crisis are threat, urgency, and uncertainty. 
A crisis occurs where an urgent response is required 
in an uncertain situation that threatens fundamental 
values or life-sustaining systems. Although turbu-
lence itself may “threaten” basic structures or values, 
it is also possible that organizations regard turbu-
lence as the “normal” state of affairs. This has been 
noted for organizations operating in “high velocity 
environments” (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1988), for 
“garbage can” organizations (Cohen et al. 1972), for 
high reliability organizations (Laporte and Consolini 
1991; Roe and Schulman 2008) and for “reforming 
organizations” where reform has become routine 
(Brunsson and Olsen 1993). Turbulence may be seen 
almost as a constitutive and systemic part of the fab-
ric of some organizations. Even if it is not a routine 
part of their operations, public organizations often 
encounter turbulence—leadership succession, surpris-
ing political demands, or scheduling conflicts—that 
may challenge governing capacity without meriting 
the label “crisis.”
Ultimately, turbulence and crisis are complementary 
concepts. Since most crises exhibit patterns of turbu-
lence, there is much to learn from the crisis manage-
ment literature (e.g., Boin and ‘t Hart 2010). However, 
by focusing analytical attention on how public organ-
izations react to, manage, and adapt to dynamic 
interdependence—whether during crisis or noncrisis 
situations—the concept of turbulence may also even-
tually contribute to our understanding of crisis man-
agement. Turbulence and crisis may also be related in 
important but poorly understood ways. The Eurozone 
faced turbulence long before the sudden financial cri-
sis hit Greece. This turbulence, however, remained 
largely unnoticed until the crisis revealed it (the crisis 
management literature might call this a “creeping cri-
sis”; see Rosenthal et al. 1989). Turbulence may also 
continue long after the immediate response to a cri-
sis and may reverberate beyond the specific domain of 
the crisis. The US Department of Homeland Security 
was created in response to 9/11 as an amalgamation of 
22 separate agencies; this unprecedented reorganiza-
tion produced on-going turbulence for these agencies 
that lasted well beyond the immediate crisis (the crisis 
management literature might refer to this as “the cri-
sis after the emergency,” noting that crises can “cast a 
long shadow”; Boin and ‘t Hart 2010, 363). Finally, 
to some extent, turbulence lends itself to measurement 
as a variable (e.g., the volatility of budgets, the rate of 
leadership turnover), thus facilitating research on how 
organizational responses vary with different levels of 
turbulence.4
Most accounts of turbulence look at it as an envi-
ronmental property that triggers responses in organi-
zations. A few scholars, however, have noted that 
turbulence is not just a property of the environment, 
but also of the internal organization. Drawing on this 
literature, we suggest that turbulence may be seen as 
both endogenous and exogenous to organizations. 
This point is particularly relevant for public organiza-
tions led by a political leadership and accountable to 
legislatures. The empirical focus on private firms rather 
than on political organizations may be one reason this 
point has been less appreciated. The mutual indiffer-
ence of political science and organizational studies 
may be another (Arellano-Gault et al. 2013; Olsen 
1991, 2010).
We can thus distinguish three levels of turbulence, 
with our original contribution relating mostly to 
the third:
- Turbulent environments: Turbulence may be pro-
duced by factors external to organizations—such as 
legal rulings, accidents, rapid technological change, 
wars, protests, partisan conflict, and so on;
- Turbulent organizations: Turbulence may be embed-
ded into organizations and institutions through 
factional conflict, staff turnover, conflicting rules, 
internal reform, complex operations, and so on;
- Turbulence of scale: Turbulence of scale appears 
when what happens at one level of authority or 
scale of activity affects what happens at another 
level or scale. A “good” solution at one level might 
be considered a “bad” solution at another level. This 
kind of turbulence typically characterizes federal or 
multilevel systems with dispersed authority where 
4 For ideas about how to operationalize environmental turbulence, see 
Volberda and van Bruggen (1997). Although there is an extensive body 
of literature operationalizing turbulence for private organizations, there 
are only a few examples for public sector organizations (see Boyne and 
Meier (2009) and Nohrstedt and Bodin (2014)).
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governance processes at one level produce govern-
ance challenges at another level.
These types of turbulence often interact. Environmental 
turbulence may trigger turbulence within organiza-
tions, which may in turn have cross-scale consequences.
Turbulence and How to Live with it
Governance in turbulent times calls upon governing 
organizations and institutions to address situations of 
dynamic complexity where well-tested solutions may 
be inadequate and where failure is typically answered 
with fierce critique. Turbulence may produce surprise, 
volatility, rapid and shifting operational tempos, con-
tradictory demands, and uncertainty. We argue that 
what makes turbulence distinctive—as a condition 
experienced by public organizations—is that it tends 
to push public organizations to make rather difficult 
tradeoffs, pulling them in contradictory, even paradox-
ical, directions. What makes turbulence distinctive—as 
an analytical lens—is that it encourages us to exam-
ine and imagine how public organization can manage 
these dilemmas in sometimes counterintuitive ways.
As a first step in developing this argument, consider 
in the abstract what happens when organizations face 
shifting parameters, intercurrence, and temporal com-
plexity. Parameters are conditions for organizing that 
public organizations take to be relatively stable and 
that they can depend upon as the form their strategies, 
make investments, and conduct routine operations. 
Therefore, as basic parameters shift, turbulence chal-
lenges existing strategies, investments, and routines, 
whereas making new ones difficult to establish. As an 
analytical concept, turbulence is not really useful for 
telling public organizations how they should optimize 
fit to a new set of organizational parameters. Rather 
it is useful for thinking about what to do when “the 
ground is in motion”—when parameters are shifting 
but have not yet restabilized. This may be a brief but a 
highly consequential period for organizations.
Intercurrence is triggered when unexpected inter-
dependencies occur. These interdependencies are typi-
cally unexpected because they occur in ways that cut 
across the grain of institutionalized patterns of action. 
Thus, paradoxically, public organizations must man-
age unexpected interdependence with the very insti-
tutions that produced the surprise. As in the case of 
shifting parameters, the value-added of turbulence as 
an analytical concept is not to provide insight into 
how to routinely manage patterns of interdependence. 
Much of our knowledge base in public administration 
advises us how to establish and manage institutions for 
the main chance—that is, to write a contract, create 
a program or structure coordination for expected cir-
cumstances. As an analytical concept, turbulence turns 
our attention to what public organizations should do 
in the event of unexpected interdependencies that must 
be managed with the tools at hand.
Temporal complexity creates a challenge for public 
organizations because the timing of different activities 
is poorly aligned or in conflict. One basic reason for 
temporal complexity is that the time frames of inter-
dependent activities occurring in parallel have clash-
ing time horizons. Another reason is that problems do 
not stand still as we try to solve them. Again, as an 
analytical concept, turbulence does not provide much 
insight about how to devise optimal scheduling or how 
to clearly define a problem so that it can be solved in a 
rational manner. Turbulence, however, is a useful con-
cept for exploring what to do when things are out of 
whack—when schedules clash or problems misbehave.
As these three points suggest, turbulence is a concept 
not for the main chance but for the off chance. The con-
cept of turbulence can—at the very least—help manag-
ers describe and diagnose the situation they are in. But 
we think it offers more. Turbulence creates dilemmas 
for public organizations. By describing these dilemmas, 
we gain some insight into how public organizations 
can handle turbulent conditions. Dilemmas pull public 
managers in different directions and the best course of 
action may be counterintuitive. We describe the “sweet 
spot” for handling turbulence not as a compromise 
between the poles of the dilemma, but rather as a logic 
that combines the horns of the dilemma. As an analyti-
cal construct, a value of turbulence is that it invites us 
to illuminate these strategies.
In the discussion that follows, we discuss four dilem-
mas that public organizations confront in handling 
turbulence—stability versus change; anticipation ver-
sus resilience; tight(er) coupling versus decoupling; and 
integration versus differentiation. As will become clear, 
these four dilemmas are not so much clearly distinct 
as they are different but related perspectives on the 
challenges organizations face in dealing with turbu-
lence. Given that the research literature on turbulence 
is much more developed for private than for public 
organizations, we draw on research on both sectors. 
Our goal is to develop insights for public organizations 
and we appreciate that public organizations operate in 
quite different environments than private organiza-
tions, but research on firms and nonprofits can fill in 
gaps in our understanding of how public organizations 
respond and manage turbulence.
Stability Versus Change
The first challenge that public organizations confront 
in the face of turbulence—and arguably the most fun-
damental—is whether to stabilize or change in the 
face of shifting parameters, intercurrence, or temporal 
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complexity. Turbulence often creates pressures to rein-
force well-known organizational solutions and gov-
erning arrangements because governance systems and 
governance practices under stress may revert to or rein-
force pre-existing organizational traditions, practices 
and formats, reinforcing institutional path-dependen-
cies (Olsen 2010, 96; Pierson 2004; Skowronek 1982). 
This may occur because organizations are thrown 
into a reactive mode of response, perhaps producing 
a “threat-rigidity” relationship (Staw et al. 1981). The 
lack of time for creating new institutions may also ren-
der decision-makers’ “pursuit of intelligence” bounded 
and their search for solutions local (March 2010, 19). 
Decision makers may have a tendency to replicate 
structures or procedures that have been perceived as 
successes in the past.
Increased speed can also produce a tendency for 
repetition and exploitation. As a result, organizations 
may become victims of trained incapacity to impro-
vise—merely due to the high speed of conduct. If 
organizations are subject to up-tempo decision-mak-
ing, repetition of patterns is sometimes necessary just 
“to keep the performance going” (Weick 1998, 553). 
However, there might also be less reactive reasons for 
institutional path-dependence in the face of turbulence. 
Pre-existing institutions may serve as an important 
source of stability in the face of turbulence, enabling 
organizations to ride out stressful times. Institutional 
robustness and “stickiness” may also be produced by 
layering new reforms on pre-existing structures rather 
than by replacing existing ones (Thelen 2003).
Although turbulence creates an impetus for pub-
lic organizations to stabilize their operations, it often 
simultaneously produces pressure for rapid change. 
Turbulent environments change quickly and unex-
pectedly and may exhibit high volatility. To avoid 
mismatches with their environment, organizations 
are pressed to quickly adapt the organization to these 
changing conditions (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1988; 
Bigley and Roberts 2001; McCann et al. 2009). As a 
result, turbulence may create pressure for more “punc-
tuated” change by questioning pre-existing governance 
arrangements and “long-cherished beliefs” in existing 
solutions (Lodge and Wegrich 2012, 11) and triggering 
institutional soul-seeking and the raising of fundamen-
tal questions about the nature of res publica (Emery 
and Giauque 2014, 24). Turbulence may also include 
sudden crises that may produce critical junctures that 
generate “windows of opportunity” for significant pol-
icy change (Kingdon 1984; Matthew 2012, 228) and 
novel organizational solutions (Jones and Baumgartner 
2005, 5). Turbulence may also trigger organizational 
meltdown and create opportunity structures for organ-
izational birth (Padgett and Powell 2012).
Organizations facing turbulent environments may 
also experience a disruption of equilibrium condi-
tions—for example, a disruption of the balance 
between political leadership and independent expertise, 
between electoral representation through parliament 
and interest group involvement, and so on. Turbulence 
may also trigger a call for building new organizational 
capacities—such as supranational capacity-building in 
an EU facing “Brexit.” Turbulent times may also spur 
the emergence of entirely new institutional arrange-
ments. Contemporary European examples include 
the rise of new European Union financial surveillance 
agencies, the structuring of the new European Union 
banking union, the emergent European energy union, 
and so on (Trondal and Bauer 2017).
Public organizations are therefore often pulled 
between the impulse to stabilize and the impulse to 
transform themselves in response to turbulence. As an 
analytical lens, therefore, turbulence encourages us to 
imagine a third scenario that we call institutional syn-
cretism, where organizations and institutions respond 
in a more syncretic fashion that is neither path-depend-
ent nor punctuated (Berk and Galvan 2009).5 As some 
scholars have begun to describe, institutional change 
is often best described as a process of recombination, 
refashioning or repurposing of existing institutions in 
an adaptive fashion. This view of institutional change 
emphasizes the ability of actors to combine existing 
institutions and new institutional innovation in a crea-
tive or improvisational way. This style of working with 
“what is at hand” is sometimes called bricolage (Baker 
and Nelson 2005).
Institutional syncretism breaks away from the dual-
ism of change versus stability—where “stability is only 
a special example of change” (Easton 1965, 106)—
and leads to an exploration of the way that institu-
tional stability creates a resource for change and the 
way that change may enhance stability (Ansell et  al. 
2015; Farjoun 2010). This position is also consist-
ent with work that stresses dynamic adaptability to 
fast-paced and uncertain circumstances (Brown and 
Eisenhardt 1997; Laporte and Consolini 1991). From 
this perspective, turbulence prompts change that is not 
merely path-dependent, but does not constitute a radi-
cal break with preexisting institutions either.
The organization theory literature is in relative 
agreement that flexibility and agility are critical traits 
for organizations to operate successfully in rapidly 
changing circumstances (de Waard et al. 2013; Kotter 
5 Even where there is an impetus for profound change, Kettl (2014, 
159)  has argued that organizations may have a tendency for 
“backsliding—toward resuming the previous equilibrium”—which 
results in modified rather than entirely new institutional arrangements.
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2012; McCann et  al. 2009; Power and Reid 2005; 
Rudd et al. 2008; Volberda 1996) and employee flexi-
bility and flexible product development strategies have 
been found to improve performance in turbulent con-
ditions (Camps et al. 2015; Lansiti 1995).6 The gov-
ernance literature also emphasizes the importance of 
“flexibility” or “agility” as important adaptive traits 
(Davis et al. 2009). Room (2011), for instance, argues 
that policymakers need “agility” to deal with complex, 
turbulent policy, while Jessop (2009) argues that tur-
bulence means that governance must adopt flexible 
repertoires (or requisite variety) to meet different types 
of situations. Similarly, Duit et  al. (2010) talk about 
a “stability-flexibility” tension in dealing with socio-
ecological complexity.
However, we also note more anomalous results from 
this “agility and flexibility” perspective. Research by 
Boyne and Meier (2009) finds that structural stability 
helps to mitigate the negative performance effects of 
turbulence on schools and Kraatz and Zajac’s (2001) 
study of higher education institutions finds that strate-
gic change is not always the best way to handle envi-
ronmental turbulence. These findings remind us that 
turbulence probably requires public organizations to 
balance both stability and flexibility (Volberda 1996). 
This perspective is reinforced by recent simulation 
research that finds that as organizational environments 
become more unpredictable, “[t]he tension between 
too much and too little structure is challenging and 
crucial to manage” (Davis et al. 2009, 438).
Stability versus change—or stability versus flexibil-
ity—is not simply an issue about how public organi-
zations make internal management decisions. It is 
also a matter of how they decide to engage externally. 
Public administration has tended to assume that gov-
ernance organizations have a desire for autonomy and 
that they coordinate with other organizations only 
when those external organizations control essential 
resources, authority, or legitimacy. The idea that inter-
dependence is a driver of networks and collaboration is 
well-appreciated in the literature. Although the role of 
turbulence per se has only been empirically addressed 
to a limited extent, Isett and Provan (2005, 152) state 
the general case:
…[S]ome would argue that organizations in the 
public and nonprofit sectors potentially experi-
ence an even greater amount of turbulence than 
private sector organizations. The additional 
turbulence is due to constantly shifting funding 
priorities and regular election cycles that disrupt 
operations in agencies when new administrations 
take office, appoint new agency heads, and alter 
existing contracts …These changes can create a 
strong need for the development and, especially, 
the maintenance of stable partnerships and inter-
organizational relationships that are likely to go 
beyond what one might witness in most business 
settings.
Their study of relationships among mental health 
agencies and nonprofits found a high degree of net-
work stability. Nohrstedt and Bodin (2014) found that 
environmental turbulence had no effect on changes in 
networks between emergency managers in Swedish 
municipalities.
In their typology of network governance, Provan 
and Kenis (2009) discuss the “stability-flexibility” 
tension in networks. They suggest that what they call 
“shared governance” networks—decentralized peer-
to-peer networks governed by those who directly par-
ticipate in them—are more oriented towards flexibility 
(see also Huybrechts and Haugh 2017). By contrast, 
the two network types that utilize specialized cen-
tralized institutions to manage network operations—
“lead organization-governed” networks and “network 
administrative organizations”—prioritize stability 
over flexibility.
Anticipation Versus Resilience
Turbulence often produces surprises for organizations 
(La Porte 2007; Pina et al. 2006). An important con-
sequence of surprise is that it makes planning difficult. 
As Wildavsky (1988) put it, planning depends on an 
organization’s capacity to anticipate the future (see also 
March and Olsen 1995, 91). Because turbulence makes 
it difficult to anticipate the future, planning based on 
fixed planning parameters will often fare badly in these 
conditions, though other planning strategies like sce-
nario planning may prove more robust (Ramírez and 
Selsky 2016).
When anticipating the future is difficult, Wildavsky 
argued, the alternative strategy is resilience. A number 
of authors have suggested that effective organizational 
adaptation to turbulence requires resilience (Hamel 
and Valikangas 2003; McCann et al. 2009). To some 
degree, the anticipation versus resilience dilemma 
6 Simulation modeling finds that decentralized organizations work best in 
turbulent but simple environments, producing rapid adaption. However, 
organizational structures based on strong lateral coordination among 
department heads or centralized structures with strong search 
capacity work best in turbulent but complex environments. Empirical 
research finds that firms with large management “teams” fare better 
than “CEO-dominant” firms in turbulent environments (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein 1993). Research on higher education institutions finds that 
higher-level managers play an important buffering role in protecting 
core organizational functions from turbulence (Cameron et al. 1987). 
Miller et al. (1996) argued that firms in turbulent environments are 
more “opportunistic” and develop more varied strategic repertoires 
and Calantone et al. (2003) found that firms speed up new product 
innovation in turbulent environments.
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restates, but also extends the stability-change discus-
sion above. In a wide reading of the literature on resil-
ience, for example, we identified two broadly different 
conceptions of resilience with important implications 
for how organizations adapt to turbulence. The first 
conception we call static resilience; the second concep-
tion we call dynamic resilience.
In the face of turbulent conditions, governing organ-
izations adopting a strategy of static resilience will take 
steps to maintain and restore equilibrium conditions. 
Because this is a strategy of resisting change, incre-
mental change that enhances or supports, or at least 
does not threaten equilibrium conditions, will be pri-
oritized. Hence this strategy encourages institutional 
path-dependence. To maintain equilibrium conditions 
in the face of turbulence, this logic is likely to strive to 
get back to basics or “stick to the knitting”—reducing 
uncertainty and complexity to achieve order and sta-
bility. From this perspective, resilience is enhanced by 
improving the “fitness” of the organization with new 
conditions. To do this, planning is likely to be a dis-
tinct formal activity that strives to anticipate how the 
organization can successfully adapt to change. In addi-
tion, to improve stability, the organization will main-
tain dedicated “buffering” capacity (organizational 
units and resources whose core task is protecting the 
organization from changing conditions).
In the logic of dynamic resilience, stability and 
change are not such sharply drawn distinctions (Easton 
1965; Farjoun 2010). Governing organizations use sta-
bility to help them change and use change to help them 
to stabilize. No clear “equilibrium” between the organ-
ization and its environment is easily discerned and the 
organization appears to be continually changing as a 
“reforming organization” (Brunsson and Olsen 1993). 
Dynamic resilience emphasizes the importance of 
building flexibility into organizational and institutional 
arrangements by absorbing complexity and incorpo-
rating requisite variety. Hence it emphasizes the impor-
tance of maintaining multiple repertoires that can be 
flexibly redeployed to meet changing circumstances. 
Rather than the sharp distinction between minor path-
dependent incremental change and major exogenously-
produced punctuated change, this logic anticipates 
endogenous change that continuously reconfigures the 
organization. The concept of recombination elides the 
distinction between stability and change since existing 
elements are conserved but organized in new arrange-
ments as response to changing circumstances. In other 
words, this strategy of dynamic equilibrium parallels 
the idea of institutional syncretism.
The strategy of dynamic equilibrium also suggests 
that the contrast between anticipation and resilience, 
although a useful analytical distinction, may be a 
false choice. Planning is indeed difficult in turbulent 
environments. But planning and anticipation are not 
quite the same thing. A classic reference here is March 
(1991), who distinguished between learning how to do 
better what you already do (exploitation) and learn-
ing about new opportunities or about how to do new 
things (exploration). Subsequent research on private 
firms has found that exploration is critical in turbu-
lent environments and can be enhanced by leadership 
and senior management team succession (cf. Posen and 
Levinthal 2012; Virany et al. 1992).7 This perspective 
has led to a stress on the “ambidexterity” of organi-
zations to balance both exploitation and exploration 
(Raisch et  al. 2009; Smith, Sutherland, and Gilbert 
2017; Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). Although strategy 
is more likely to be emergent than rationally planned 
under turbulent conditions, the capacity to anticipate 
the direction and significance of change is likely to 
become more not less important.
This contrast between static and dynamic resilience 
is merely an ideal type. In practice, the two strategies 
are often combined, revealing a complex interplay 
between strategies of resilience and institutional 
change. A study of the German Ministry of Finance’s 
response to the recent financial crisis provides a good 
example (McCowan 2017). This classic bureaucratic 
hierarchy maintained impressive stability in the face 
of this turbulence, making this a case of path depend-
ence. However, the study shows that the Ministry’s 
hierarchical structures were not particularly flexible in 
adapting to the circumstances of the crisis. As a result, 
temporary and informal collegial structures (networks) 
emerged to meet the challenge. These collegial struc-
tures were far more flexible and effective than the 
otherwise dominant hierarchical structure. This case 
exemplifies the importance of hybrid organizational 
solutions, which we will discuss below.
Tight(Er) Coupling Versus Decoupling
A third dilemma confronts public organizations with 
a decision about whether they should respond to tur-
bulence by tightening their control over the source of 
turbulence (tight coupling) or whether they should 
manage it by isolating themselves from the source 
of turbulence (decoupling) (Beekun and Ginn 1993; 
Perrow 1984). This tight coupling-decoupling dilemma 
can be observed across all three levels of turbulence 
that we describe—turbulent organizations, turbulent 
environments, and turbulence of scale.
In using the terms tight-coupling, loose coupling, 
and decoupling, we follow Orton and Weick (1990, 
205) in their description of a “dialectical” approach:
7 Hanvanich et  al. (2006) found that firms with a strong learning 
orientation had a competitive edge in highly turbulent environments.
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If there is neither responsiveness nor distinctive-
ness, the system is not really a system, and it can 
be defined as a noncoupled system. If there is 
responsiveness without distinctiveness, the sys-
tem is tightly coupled. If there is distinctiveness 
without responsiveness, the system is decoupled. 
If there is both distinctiveness and responsive-
ness, the system is loosely coupled. This general 
image is described here as the dialectical interpre-
tation of loose coupling.
In addition, we understand coupling to be both a con-
text of action and a strategy of action.
The tensions between tighter coupling and decou-
pling are vividly illustrated in the context of the tur-
bulence of scale. Turbulence of scale occurs when 
organizational solutions found at one level or scale 
of organization or government causes new problems of 
turbulence at another level or scale. The turbulence of 
scale that results is a quite frequent occurrence in tightly 
interwoven organized democracies, but often neglected 
by both reformers and most observers (Zohlnhofer and 
Rub 2016, 3). The European Commission, for example, 
tries to reduce its own internal turbulence by issuing 
calls for “better coordination.” This solution, however, 
may cause turbulence for member-state governments 
and involve an unintended consequence for adminis-
trative sovereignty within domestic government insti-
tutions (Egeberg and Trondal 2016). Creating more 
consistency among decisions horizontally as well as 
vertically is a commonly stated goal in contemporary 
western democracies. Recent administrative doctrines 
share a near universal belief in the desirability of bet-
ter coordination (e.g., Peters 2004). What is often not 
appreciate, however, is how the ambition of strong 
coordination of governance processes at one level of 
government may be incompatible with strong coordi-
nation of governance processes across levels (Egeberg 
and Trondal 2016). This illustrates the challenge 
of “nationally embedding a supranational project” 
(Bulmer and Joseph 2016, 738). Turbulence of scale 
thus illustrates the ambiguities attached to suggesting 
“good” governance solutions (Grindle 2017).
Decoupling is another strategy for dealing with tur-
bulence of scale. Decoupling can deter the failure of one 
component from reverberating across entire systems. 
“Bad” solutions may therefore be implemented in parts 
of organizations without “ruining it all.” Decoupling 
of talk, decision and action has also been seen as a 
tool for governments to satisfy multiple audiences at 
different scales (Brunsson 1989). Moreover, this argu-
ment introduces agency into the analysis. Reformists 
may carefully decouple organizational units in order 
to seek legitimacy from multiple institutional fields, 
thereby securing long term organizational viability 
(McCowan 2017). Such decoupling exercises have 
been observed in EU member-states in their efforts to 
combine an official façade of “active European policy” 
whereas at the same time practicing “hands-off” politi-
cal control of national EU politics with a correspond-
ing active bureaucracy. Decoupling makes it possible 
to develop an organizational infrastructure that allows 
EU coordination across levels, while maintaining lee-
way and room for policy manoeuvre across levels (Van 
Thiel et al. 2012, 423).
Demands for tighter coupling or decoupling can 
also be seen within and across public organizations. 
Students of organizations and institutions suggest sev-
eral decoupling mechanisms. Behavioral theories of 
organization suggest that resources and organizational 
“slack” may moderate the effects of turbulence (Cyert 
and March 1963; Kraatz and Zajac 2001). Sociological 
institutionalism offers insights into how organizations 
use image making and the manipulation of symbols, 
myths, and ceremony to cope with demanding environ-
ments (Feldman and March 1981; Meyer and Rowan 
1977). The array of organizational responses includes 
isomorphic adaptation of talk and/or decisions in 
organizations (Meyer and Rowan 1977), decoupling 
of talk, decisions, and actions, and of actions and out-
come (Bromley and Powell 2012).
Alternatively, turbulence may also create incen-
tives to tighten the coupling between otherwise 
decoupled systems. For example, turbulence has also 
been perceived as a driver of collaborative govern-
ance. In one of the earliest statements, Gray (1985) 
argued that environmental turbulence reduces the 
ability of organizations to plan and act unilaterally, 
leading to collaboration. More recently, Bryson et al. 
(2006) and Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011) suggest 
that turbulence creates a demand for cross-sector 
partnerships.
Loose-coupling is paradoxically both a source 
of turbulence and a strategy for adapting to turbu-
lence (Perrow 1984). It may facilitate the coexist-
ence of different organizing temporalities, while 
also creating the possibility of periodic intercur-
rence. Polyrhythmic organizations with several tempi 
would be considered more turbulent than organiza-
tions geared towards only one tempo. However, sev-
eral rhythmic patterns may concurrently co-exist in 
governance processes in a mutually competing—yet 
compatible—whole. When several rhythmic patterns 
are layered like this, temporality becomes complex 
and challenging, but at the same time may unlock 
possibilities for innovation and change embedded in 
each pattern.
Orton and Weick (1990) note three strategies for 
loose-coupling as a strategy: requisite variety, modu-
larity, and discretion. As noted above in the section 
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on dynamic resilience, requisite variety refers to the 
advantages of having an internal diversity that cor-
responds to the diversity of organizational envi-
ronments. Modularity refers to the ability to easily 
assemble and reassemble organizational competences 
to meet customized demands, with incident command 
systems being one well-known version of modular 
systems in the public sector (Ansell and Keller 2014; 
Bigley and Roberts 2001). Discretion refers to the 
ability of managers or employees to make decisions 
on the spot without lengthy clearance or external 
approval.
The principles of requisite variety, modularity 
and discretion can be illustrated using the example 
of the Coast Guard, whose response strategies were 
dissected following its relatively successful perfor-
mance during Hurricane Katrina. Although no one 
has described the Coast Guard in terms of modular-
ity, its capacity to mobilize a “…broadly dispersed 
organization and asset structure” suggests a modular 
response strategy. To facilitate the rapid combination 
of organization and assets for any particular mission, 
the Coast Guard relies heavily on standardized tech-
nologies and practices. Such standardization sounds 
bureaucratic and hence perhaps inimical to the type of 
customized response required in turbulent situations. 
However, this standardization facilitates the rapid 
modular assembly of dispersed people and technol-
ogy. As the General Accountability Office observed: 
“For the Hurricane Katrina response, standardization 
enabled Coast Guard personnel from anywhere in the 
country to form unified crews to perform operations 
and maintenance”. The requisite variety enabled by 
modularity is reinforced by a “principle of flexibility” 
dictating that resources for a mission can be sourced 
from anywhere in the extended organization.8 The 
Coast Guard principle of “on-scene initiative” affords 
front-line employees the discretion to respond to situ-
ations as they arise—discretion nevertheless guided 
by a strong common culture that creates a sense of 
common purpose and preparedness reminiscent of the 
work of Selznick (1989) or Kaufman (1976). Finally, 
modularity, requisite variety and discretion carry over 
to the Coast Guard’s facility for engaging in “contin-
gent coordination” with other agencies on as-needed 
basis.
Integration Versus Differentiation
The final dilemma we observe contrasts a strategy of 
managing turbulence through integration (vertical and 
horizontal) with one of managing it through differen-
tiation. This is, of course, a classic issue in organization 
theory. Early work found that organizations may deal 
with uncertainties in their environments through pat-
terns of vertical integration, or as Williamson (1975) 
put it, by making rather than buying. The opposite 
of the integration story is one of differentiation, in 
which organizations create special units or buy rather 
than make. Differentiation may lead organizations to 
occupy specific niches where they can outshine their 
competitors or, as in the case of “agencification,” may 
lead to the design of agencies with narrow regulatory 
missions.
At the extreme of integration, we expect unitary 
vertically-integrated organizations with divisions; 
as we move to the other extreme of the differentia-
tion, we expect a proliferation of smaller specialized 
organizations. At both extremes, the logic is one of 
“pure types” of organizations. As with our previous 
discussions, however, under turbulent conditions 
we expect public organizations to be pulled in both 
directions—toward both integration and differentia-
tion. The dilemma is addressed, we suggest, through 
“hybrid” and “interstitial” strategies. Hybrid struc-
tures may combine components from various organi-
zational forms or institutional logics, bridge across 
functional domains, or mix characteristics of state, 
market, and civil society (Ansell and Trondal 2017; 
Battilana and Lee 2014; Brandsen and Karré 2011; 
Minkoff 2002; Skelcher and Smith 2015), whereas 
interstitial structures mediate between structures 
(Batora 2017).
Brandsen and Karré (2011, 831) write that “Hybrid 
organizations usually emerge in turbulent environ-
ments where many contingencies affect their activities 
and performance.” Hybridity helps to create the struc-
tural flexibility necessary to respond to competing and 
varied demands. One perspective on hybridity implicit 
in the literature comes close to describing hybridity as a 
form of requisite variety and modularity. Hybrids take 
advantage of the heterogeneity and pluralism of insti-
tutional environments (Kraatz and Block 2008), treat-
ing organizational forms as “building blocks” that can 
be combined in various ways (Battilana and Lee 2014). 
To be sustainable, however, hybrid organizations may 
have to forge a common identity that transcends dif-
ferent logics or forms (Battilana and Dorado 2010). 
Skelcher and Smith (2015) hypothesize that a certain 
kind of hybrid that they call a “blended hybrid,” which 
synergistically combines logics to form a new contex-
tually-specific logic, is likely to develop in response to 
turbulence.
8 The value of modularity and loose-coupling has been recognized 
for military organizations (Bezooijen and Kramer 2015). In recent 
research on Dutch military organization, De Waard et al. (2013) find that 
modularity is a predominant mode of response when the imperative is 
“to react adequately” in the face of turbulence, but that organizational 
sensing is more prominent when the imperative was “to react rapidly” 
in the face of turbulence.
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Batora (2013, 599)  defines an “interstitial organi-
zation” as “…an organization emerging in interstices 
between various organizational fields and recom-
bining physical, informational, financial, legal and 
legitimacy resources stemming from organizations 
belonging to these different organizational fields.”9 
Using the European External Action Service as an 
example, Batora argues that interstitial organizations 
are capable of mobilizing heterogeneity and innova-
tion. His description suggests an interesting contrast 
with modularity. As described in the Coast Guard 
case, modular units use standardized interfaces to cre-
ate “building blocks” that can be combined in various 
ways. Interstitial organizations do similar work by 
bridging across and adapting to different institutional 
interfaces.
Hybrid and interstitial responses to turbulence of 
scale may be particularly important for addressing 
turbulence created by multilevel governance (Hooghe 
and Marks 2001) and the “wicked problems” it can 
produce (e.g., Conklin 2006). Hybrid and interstitial 
organizations are often improvisational solutions to 
the governance dilemmas created by complex insti-
tutional ecologies (see Lægreid et  al. 2014, 4). For 
example, through duplication of agency staff, politi-
cal steering of agencies may be strengthened without 
fully integrating agencies into ministries (Egeberg 
2012). Other examples include the programme man-
agement system installed by the Finnish government 
to identify cross-cutting issues (Kekkonen and Raunio 
2011) or the national coordinators (“tzars”) instituted 
by the Swedish government to better handle “wicked 
problems” that transcend existing sector ministries 
(Statskontoret 2014). Such mechanisms might be 
interpreted as attempts to restore and integrate the 
capacity of the government centre (Dahlström et  al. 
2011, 17)  without fundamentally reforming it. Task 
forces, duplication and overlap, new procedures, com-
mittee structures, and enlarged organizations may be 
interpreted as “second-best” organizational solutions 
installed to compensate for governance challenges 
that were amplified by NPM reforms (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2007). So-called “post-NPM reforms” 
are “seen as supplementary adjustments producing 
increased complexity in public sector organizations” 
(Lægreid and Verhoest 2010, 290). Beyond structural 
measures, hybrid solutions may be supported by softer 
measures, such as re-establishing “common ethics” and 
“cohesive cultures” in public governance (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2011).
The EU has “accepted” the emergence of hybrid 
organizational forms to cope with problems of scale. 
For example, not having its own agencies to imple-
ment EU legislation at the national level, the European 
Commission has instead, as a second-best solution, 
“adopted” domestic agencies, by making them “double 
hatted” institutions—not only national, but European 
too (Egeberg and Trondal 2016). The Commission 
thus seems to manage to live with the tension between 
the wish for uniform governance across member states 
whereas at the same time not seriously interfering in 
national “administrative sovereignty.” This may not be 
a perfect organizational solution from the perspective 
of standardization of EU policies across member coun-
tries, but might be considered a satisfactory second-
best solution given Europe’s administrative legacy.
Conclusion
If turbulence is the “new normal” for public admin-
istration and governance, we need a better analytical 
framework for understanding its effects and the pos-
sible responses to it. This article elaborates such an 
analytical framework, defining turbulence as situations 
where events, demands, and support interact in highly 
variable, inconsistent, unexpected and unpredictable 
ways. Although turbulence is typically quite context-
specific, we argue that it is useful as a generic analytical 
construct precisely because it calls attention to the way 
that public organizations, despite their different con-
texts, manage shifting parameters, intercurrence, and 
temporal complexity.
To make progress toward understanding turbu-
lence, we distinguished three types of turbulence: 
turbulent environments, turbulent organizations, and 
turbulence of scale. Most of the research on turbu-
lence has focused on how organizations respond to 
turbulence in their environments (turbulent environ-
ments). However, it is also important to appreciate that 
organizations themselves become internally turbulent 
(turbulent organizations). Finally, we note that much 
turbulence can be traced to the multilevel character of 
governance (turbulence of scale). Governing solutions 
at one scale may become problems at another.
How do public organizations, networks and collab-
orations respond to turbulence? We discern two broad 
strategies. One strategy is to stabilize; the other is to 
adapt. These two strategies are not mutually exclu-
sive and may be complementary. Effective governance 
often entails balancing continuity and stability on the 
one hand with adaptability and experimentation on 
the other. Yet these strategies also suggest different pat-
terns of institutional change and modes of organiza-
tional and governance response:
9 Similarly, Olsson et  al. (2006) describe the importance of “shadow 
networks” for navigating the turbulence of environmental resource 
management.
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• If public organizations and governance systems opt 
to stabilize in the face turbulence, they will produce 
a pattern of path dependence. They may do this by 
reactively coping with turbulent conditions, erect-
ing various kinds of buffers or decoupling to protect 
themselves from future environmental shocks, cre-
ating centralized capacity, and formalizing network 
agreements. We call this “static resilience” because it 
tries to maintain the status quo. Should this strategy 
fail, more sweeping change—a punctuated equilib-
rium—may be the outcome.
• If public organizations and governance systems 
opt to adapt to turbulence, they will tend to pro-
duce a pattern of institutional change we call insti-
tutional syncretism, leading to more continuous 
but less dramatic reorganizations. They do this by 
adopting a wider variety of strategies often of a 
hybrid nature, acting in a more improvisational 
and experimental fashion, favoring flexible struc-
tures and decentralized initiatives, and developing 
informal networks and other interstitial arrange-
ments to achieve coordination in rapidly evolving 
situations. We call this strategy “dynamic resil-
ience” because the public organization or govern-
ance system adapts more continuously in the face 
of turbulence.
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